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RECONSIDERING WHAT NIETZSCHE MEANT BY THE SAME  
IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE 
 
It is not possible to step twice into the same river. 
      -Heraclitus 
 
I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with 
this serpent--not to a new life, or a better life, or a similar life: I 
come again eternally to this same (gleichen) and selfsame 
(selbigen) life, in its greatest and its smallest, to teach again the 
eternal recurrence (ewigeWiederkunft) of all things.  
-Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
 
ABSTRACT 
Hermeneutical considerations involving the nuances of words in 
translation have a bearing in interpreting philosophical concepts. Stambaugh 
highlighted the eternal in Nietzsche as well as the meaning of the Same in the 
doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. As translation of the German 
word das Gleiche, she provided important considerations regarding the 
nuances of das Gleiche and the sense of how the English word “the same” 
could capture as well as leave out some meanings in the original. This paper 
builds on Stambaugh’s observations by providing a linguistic analysis of das 
Gleiche to open up to how it does mean immediacy and likeness as Stambaugh 
already observed, but the said analysis propels the discussion further by also 
pointing to the fact that das Gleiche also refers to what is imminent and 
forthcoming.  This reconsidered meaning of das Gleiche as imminent and open 
to futurity will provide a fresh understanding of Nietzsche’s doctrine. The 
paper ends by featuring Higgins’s reading of eternal recurrence as present-
oriented akin to the temporal experience of music to show that this insight in 
Higgins could also be developed further by showing the futurity and 
imminence of music as hermeneutical key to Nietzsche’s doctrine. 
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The task of this paper is a further explication of the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence of the same by focusing on what Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900] meant 
by the Same. We must remember that the full expression of the doctrine is the eternal 
recurrence/return of the same. I will provide here an exposition of the work already 
done by Joan Stambaugh [1932-2013] to which I will add my own linguistic analysis 
to further explicate Nietzsche’s meaning. 
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I refer to Nietzsche’s doctrine as eternal recurrence. This is consistent with 
the practice in the Nietzsche literature. Even outside Nietzsche and studies on 
Nietzsche, this is the same name associated with some ancient cosmologies of cyclical 
time, including Stoic cosmology (or physics). The alternative term, of course, is 
eternal return. These two terminologies, eternal recurrence and eternal return appear 
as interchangeable without any loss to the fundamental meaning of the doctrine they 
both express. However, listening sensitively to each term will open up a slight yet 
significant difference between the two. Recurrence moves within the temporal sense. 
It refers to an occurrence that happens again. For something to occur and recur, that 
something must happen in time. The Latin root of the word is currere: to run. It seems 
that running has always been the mental image for time. One thinks of an athlete on 
an oval track or the playing track of recorded media. In both cases, coaches  are 
conscious of the running time as the athlete completes the circuit and music producers 
of the running time as the music plays. To recur is to run again or to run back. On the 
other hand, return moves within the spatial sense. It refers to how something could go 
back to its place of origin. For something to return, that something must reappear in 
the same place as before. Thus Oedipus returned, and not recurred, to Thebes as a 
foreigner. The Latin root of the word is tornus: a lathe; a machine that turns 
something so that it goes back round and round its axis. 
In Nietzsche’s German, Wiederkunft roughly corresponds to recurrence and 
Wiederkehr to return. The German prefix wieder- roughly corresponds to the Latin 
and English re-. Thus to repeat is wiederholen, to see again is wiedersehen, to bring 
back is wiederbringen. Wiederkehr is found in most German dictionaries. Kehre and 
kehren mean the turn (noun) and to turn (verb) respectively. Wiederkunft, however, 
has fallen out of use if it is not a neologism by Nietzsche. Zukunft is the German word 
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for the future and künftig means up-and-coming. Thus the translation of Wiederkunft 
as recurrence and Wiederkehr as return retain the same temporal and spatial sense of 
the two German words respectively. Stambaugh agrees with some of the observations 
stated here when she says: 
 A basic distinction between Wiederkehr and Wiederkunft, more sharply drawn 
in English than in German, is that what recurs is an event, something which 
has previously occurred. What returns might be anything, including a person, 
which goes back to where it was. A recurrence is something which has run 
through its course and occurs again. A return implies a turning about and 
going back to an original place or state. A person cannot “recur” home; an 
event cannot “return,” in the sense of going back to its original state. 
Returnemphasizes a going back, a completion of movement. Recurrence 
emphasizes another occurrence or beginning of a movement. Thus recurrence 
is closer in meaning to repetition than return (Stambaugh 1972, 30). 
 
Since the main thesis of this paper has to do with time, I have chosen to refer 
to the doctrine as eternal recurrence rather than eternal return. But at this point, we 
have to admit that the above terminologies are only shorthand for the actual name that 
Nietzsche gave his doctrine, which is the eternal recurrence/return of the same. This 
is what Nietzsche gave his doctrine the moment he made it his own. Thus the genitive 
“of the same” is not present in the name of the doctrine hitherto.  The original German 
phrasing is ewige Wiederkunft/Wiederkehr des Gleiches. If we ask what it is that 
eternally recurs or returns, the answer is: the Same (das Gleiche).1 Stambaugh has 
given much attention to the meaning of the Same. I shall feature the work she already 
accomplished on the topic so that I may add my own contribution. 
Stambaugh: the eternal in the thought of eternal recurrence 
 
1 This is the nominative form of the noun. The genitive form expressed in 
English as “of the Same” is des Gleiches. Similarly, readers of Hegel know that 
dasGeist is the nominative form of the German word for spirit and appears in the title 
Phänomenologie des Geistes as such because of the genitive case. 
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 Stambaugh focuses on the eternal recurrence as a thought: an insight that 
invaded Nietzsche on that particular August day in 1881. She uses Nietzsche’s own 
word invade to emphasize the sudden coming of the thought to the thinker and its 
arrival like a lightning flash that both surprises and changes the man. The thought 
changed him so radically that he even ended up identifying it as the central theme of 
his philosophy. But Stambaugh is also quick to point out that even Nietzsche himself 
did not know what to do with it when it first came to him and he was not able to shake 
it off for the rest of his thinking and writing. 
Stambaugh focuses on the eternal return as a thought. The question of what it 
means to think the eternal return is what guides her interpretation. Thinking the 
eternal return establishes some sort of relationship between the thinker and the 
cosmos. Stambaugh endeavors to show that the nature of the eternal return as thought 
brings the relationship of the thinker to the cosmos to sharp focus. By bringing 
attention to the fact that Nietzsche rejected all forms of transcendence save for the 
eternal, she draws out the relevance of the temporal relationship of the thinker to the 
cosmos in interpreting the eternal return. To be more exact, one could also say that the 
eternal return as such immediately establishes a temporal relation with the cosmos, for 
the cosmos is always experienced temporally.  
She begins her study with Nietzsche’s rejection of transcendence. This is a 
well-known Nietzschean position. Every form of beyond devalues life. Every form of 
beyond becomes an unreachable standard that leads even the wisest among 
philosophers to put in the judgment that life is no good. Every form of beyond is the 
enemy of all things earthly and human. If you shall arrange seats at a dinner party, 
never assign Plato and Nietzsche to the same table. But it seems Nietzsche’s rejection 
of transcendence was not wholesale. He allowed one category to remain: the category 
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of the eternal. If Nietzsche rejects divine perfection, the afterlife, utopia, and so on, he 
not only has a soft spot for eternity, he has even made it the centerpiece of his 
philosophy.  However, as must be expected from Nietzsche vouching for eternity, he 
has a distinct understanding of eternity so radical and original that it ends up siding 
with imminence and becoming. In other words, Nietzsche’s understanding of eternity 
and the Same remains exclusively outside that which he rejected, namely, all the other 
forms of transcendence.  As Stambaugh puts it: 
The question that arises here is: why did Nietzsche not reject eternity along 
with the other transcendent or transcendental concepts that belong to it? With 
what, then, was he left? An eternal what or whom? If there is no God or Spirit, 
or One or Being to be eternally, what is it that is eternal? The only answer is 
that Nietzsche had a new and very problematical concept of eternity. What 
was eternal for him was the return of the Same (Stambaugh 1972, 3). 
 
 Stambaugh then endeavors to show the contrast between the traditional 
meaning of eternity against Nietzsche’s own. She shows that there are four basic 
meanings of the word: (1) endless duration; (2) an eternal present (nunc stans), a 
present that never ceases to be present, never becomes past; (3) the simultaneity of all 
the disparate, disrupted, successive parts of time; and (4) timelessness. 
 Eternity as endless duration is easiest to grasp but it is the one that makes the 
least sense to Nietzsche’s doctrine. Endless duration is like being caught in the frozen 
moment of a photograph and being unable to break free from it. It is to keep an 
experience going on and on without end along with the feelings we associate with it.  
Eternity as eternal present is probably the sense that is closest to Nietzsche’s 
meaning but never quite captures it. In this view, the present never came from a future 
and will never fade into the past. The present moment just remains without any 
reference to the future or the past. Time does not stand still in the sense of endless 
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duration above, but time does not move on either. I shall go back to this after 
clarifying Nietzsche’s meaning. 
Simultaneity of all parts of time dissolves the successiveness of time. All 
events of past, present, and future happen all at the same time. This bears the closest 
resemblance to the point of view of a God who exists outside of time. Everything that 
has happened, is happening, and will happen are all the same to this omniscient view 
of events. This is a very interesting view, but it is nobody’s view for no human being 
experiences time in this way. 
Lastly, timelessness ultimately rejects all forms of change. Since time is the 
stage upon which change happens, timelessness makes change impossible. Everything 
becomes static and lifeless in this conception of time which is not a conception at all 
because it cannot be thought let alone experienced. It cannot have any concrete 
meaning because it is an absolute negation of our very experience of time.   
In sum, the traditional interpretation of eternity lies in the act of elevating 
time, with all the experience of its flux; transience; its modes of past, present, and 
future; to the level of eternity. This is similar to redeeming becoming into Being, the 
many to the One, the imminent into the transcendent.   As Stambaugh put it, “the 
Western philosophical tradition thinks eternity as some sort of negation, overcoming, 
prolongation, or gathering together of the successive passing moments of time. 
Nietzsche does not (Stambaugh 1972, 3).” 
 For Nietzsche, there is no end, and there is no such thing as a once and for all. 
Franz Kafka [1883-1924] captured this insight so well with his critique of the modern 
bureaucracy. The civil servant never accomplishes the work once and for all. It just 
goes on and on. The bureaucrat seeks reprieve through vacation leaves only to be 
plunged back to the daily grind afterwards. The run of the mill Hollywood 
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blockbuster gives us the satisfaction that the hero has succeeded once and for all and 
the villain is vanquished, only to be offered a sequel that makes the villain rise again 
for a new struggle with  the hero. In the single movie Star Wars turned film franchise,  
Luke Skywaker defeats the Empire and saves his father from the dark side of the 
force, then he becomes a recluse only to be fetched again for a new struggle with the 
First Order. It seems the Resistance cannot resist once and for all. It goes on and on. 
 In our lives, it seems that once and for all only applies to the departed. The 
departed has died once and for all but the bereaved must go on. After the funeral and 
the burial, the ones who survived the departed must go back to the ordinary world to 
go on. Even if Indian thought vis-a-vis the reality of death posited eternal recurrence 
by way of metempsychosis, it had to arrive at a once and for all in the form of 
Atman’s immersion in Brahman (Hinduism) or through the attainment of nirvana 
(Hinayana Buddhism). The context, of course of Indian thought is release from 
suffering. Stambaugh contrasts this with Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence: 
Nietzsche, however, rejected every kind of striving for release from eternal 
recurrence as nihilistic. It was precisely eternal recurrence which he wishes to 
affirm. He also rejected the interpretation of eternal recurrence as a 
transmigration of souls (Nietzsche 1999, 13:378), on the ground that it was a 
reversed Darwinism.2 closely related to this rejection of transmigration was his 
emphasis on the word “same (Stambaugh 1972, 5).” 
 
 World religions are uncomfortable with the human condition I am describing 
here: that the world goes on and on without end. In the Abrahamic faiths, the world 
 
2 Nietzsche (1999, 13:378) wrote this entry bridging together ideas from 
Hindu and Greek traditions with references to the caste system and the world soul. It 
alludes to Plato as the spirit of Manu (the first man in Hindu mythology), juxtaposing 
Plato as Brahmanist with Pyrrho as Buddhist. As philosophical types, they represent 
the separation between esoteric and exoteric teachings. I translate the last line thus: 
“the transmigration of souls as reversed Darwinism (--is not Greek) [die 
Seelenwanderung als umgekehrter Darwinismus (--ist nicht griechisch)]. My 
interpretation regarding the reversal is that metempsychosis looks back to a glorious 
initial state (Manu as archetype) whereas Darwinism posits that the best state is in a 
future form. 
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we know has an end. Islam and Christianity both believe in a transcendent permanent 
state in its aftermath. Judaism has no orthodox position on what form the afterlife 
takes, but there is a permanent afterlife nonetheless. In the East, metempsychosis is 
seen as suffering and punishment and thus every soul must find a way to escape the 
wheel of rebirth. In Hinduism it is in the unity of Atman (the individual soul) with 
Brahman (the ultimate reality). In Buddhism, perfection is in the nothingness called 
nirvana. All these worldviews are at bottom nihilistic for Nietzsche. They all deny our 
actual experience of the world and of time as continuously changing and never 
ending. They say nay to the repeating cycle of time and life and tell the laborer that 
toil has its ending. They say nay to human suffering and insist that our condition is 
only temporary. They say nay to life in favor of an afterlife (or as Nietzsche says of 
Plato, an afterworld). The eternal recurrence of the same is Nietzsche’s yes to toil, 
suffering, and life. 
Stambaugh on das Gleiche 
 Stambaugh notes that Nietzsche’s use of das Gleiche is rather unusual. I 
demonstrate her point this way: imagine that Nietzsche’s mother-tongue was English 
and he called the doctrine eternal recurrence of the same. Translators to German 
would most probably render it as ewige Wiederkehr des Selben and the commentaries 
and interpretations in English and German would remain unaltered. Selbe is the 
German counterpart of the English pronoun same.3 The phrase “in the same house” is 
im selben Haus in German. The phrase “at the same time” is zur selben Zeit. 
Consequently, Selbst is the German counterpart of the English noun self. What are the 
 
3 The nuance is felt in the quotation that begins this paper. Let me repeat it 
here. Zarathustra says: “I will return to this same and selfsame life (Nietzsche 2006, 
178).” The German reads: „ich komme ewig wieder zu diesem gleichen und selbigen 
Leben (Nietzsche 1999, 4:276).“ 
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consequences of Nietzsche’s decision to go with the unusual des Gleiches instead of 
the more familiar des Selben? If you remove the letter g from gleich, it would sound 
close to the English like. Stambaugh states that these two words are etymologically 
related. But be that as it may, das Gleiche is not identity simpliciter and therefore 
does not really mean the Same. The word resides in the middle of the Same and the 
Similar but neither of them at the same time. 
 Can we think of the same as content? Asking this question brings Stambaugh 
close to interpretations of the eternal recurrence as the empirical make up of the 
cosmos when she states: 
The problem of the Same is the problem of “what” recurs. If the Same is not 
simply taken as the content stuffed into a prefabricated scheme of “eternal 
recurrence,” a content totally indifferent to the process of recurrence, it 
becomes even more problematic and challenges the whole meaning of the 
phrase “eternal recurrence of the Same.” If the Same were simply this 
indifferent, dead content caught up in recurring cycles, it would make no 
difference whether it was a thing or a tree or a man which recurred. The 
essential passages--that is, those in which Nietzsche is trying to think out the 
meaning of his thought, and not to “prove” it with the concepts of limited 
force and unlimited time (even these are very fruitful when not taken at a 
pseudoscientific level)--render an understanding of the Same as content 
impossible (Stambaugh 1972, 31). 
 
Stambaugh emphasizes above that repetition of content renders irrelevant 
whether it is a thing, a tree or a man which recurred. Thus it is not as simple as saying 
that time is a cycle and all particles of matter simply appear again and again in that 
prefabricated scheme of recurrences. She clearly notes that Nietzsche was not out to 
prove recurrence as true and therefore we must be careful in construing the doctrine in 
empirical scientific terms. The task is to think out the meaning of the thought of 
eternal recurrence. 
Given that it is not as simple as something identical recurring, we are led to 
think of the Same as some sort of process. There is no such thing as substance or 
content in the traditional sense in the mind of Nietzsche. And since it is concerned 
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with process, Stambaugh identifies the main emphasis of Nietzsche’s doctrine as time 
and eternity with the human being in sharp focus. She contends that it is not about the 
recurrence of something which is in time, but time itself, the moment, which comes 
again. We easily stumble into thinking that there are two elements expressed in the 
name of the doctrine: the first element is time as eternally recurring and the second 
element is the content that recurs, i.e. the Same. Stambaugh exposes our error by 
saying that time eternally recurs and it is time itself that eternally recurs. This is what 
she means by rendering the Same as content impossible. Thinking the meaning of 
eternal recurrence leads her to conclude that Nietzsche’s act of eternalizing time 
comes from being invaded by the thought that it is time as experienced humanly 
speaking which eternally recurs. 
A Linguistic Analysis of the German word das Gleiche 
 My contribution focuses on the nuance of das Gleiche that is lost in its 
translation as the Same. The nuance is very subtle in that it could only be observed in 
certain uses of the word leading to it being easily overlooked by German and 
Germanophone commentators of Nietzsche. First of all, let us admit that in many 
cases in spolken language, speakers employ some words as substantive: a word that is 
not a noun but transposed to have all and every grammatical characteristic of a noun. 
As for the word das Gleiche, it is not found in the German dictionary but it is 
expressed in spoken language. If I see something I like, and I say that I want the same, 
that is expressed in German by saying Ich mag das Gleiche. But das Gleiche is mostly 
known in formal German as either an adjective or adverb: gleich. The same is true of 
the translation the Same. The word same is employed above as a pronoun (standing in 
for a noun) but is known in formal English as an adjective, adverb, but never as a 
noun. Let us now enter the world of ordinary speaking and writing. 
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 I am not saying that it is incorrect to translate gleich as same. In the most usual 
sense, this is the translation of the word that will make the most sense, as the above 
example already illustrated. Here we see equivalence between the German word and 
its English translation. The meaning of the German word is absolutely, exactly the 
same as the English translation. But there are other instances when gleich could not be 
translated as same. Consider the following use of the word: 
 Zwei mal zwei ist gleich vier. 
 Two times two is equal to four. 
 In mathematical examples and statements regarding equality, gleich is 
employed.4 The German word egal which comes from the same Latin root as the 
English equal is employed differently. You use egal to state indifference, or that 
something doesn’t matter. Compare: 
Es ist mir egal. 
It is (all) the same to me. 
 Gleich differs from “same” in cases when the former is taken as an adverb. As 
adverb, gleich could mean straightaway or immediately. Consider the following 
examples that feature gleich in the purely temporal sense. Let us say that you are 
watching German television. When a program ends and the title of the next one is 
announced over the interim, you may read on the screen: 
 Gleich: Nachrichten. 
 Next: News. 
 
 The English word next is the proper translation to fit the Anglophone context 
but it does not do justice to gleich here. German has a similar word: nächst that 
functions exactly the same way as the English “next” in expressing temporal 
succession. Thus the sense that is expressed here is not the temporal succession 
 
4 Compare: alle Menschen sind gleich, with“all humans are equal.” 
12 
 
between the finished program and the one about to begin. The next feature is only 
forthcoming but the television station does not want the viewer to change channels in 
the interim and so gives the assurance that the next program follows in a few seconds. 
It is as if the next program is already being featured. What is identified as next in a 
series is already experienced here and now. Take another example: this time of a 
father telling his son to hurry. 
 Es ist gleich zehn (Uhr)! 
 It is already ten (o’clock)! 
 
In this example, anyone familiar with the context knows that it is probably not strictly 
true that it is already ten o’clock. It is probably a few minutes before ten but 
depending on the level of stress, the father is definitely noting that ten comes soon if 
not quickly and thus there is no time to lose. Even if they are not yet late, they will 
definitely be late if the son does not hurry. It is as if the hour has already descended 
while it is still on its way. 
 There are other examples where the temporal sense of gleich touches upon a 
spatial sense. In the example that follows, we will see how the use of the German 
word  gives the same sense of the imminent future but this time, it is by way of 
dissolving the spatial distance. This is found in cases when the word expresses the 
immediacy of arriving somewhere closeby. The time it takes to arrive is so 
momentary that it is as if one has already arrived. Imagine a mother standing on the 
front porch of the house calling for her child who is at a  nearby playground. 
 Mutter: Komm hier. Kind: Gleich! 
 Mother: Come here. Child: Coming! 
 
Notice that there is a big difference between the single word answers in German and 
in English. If we give the more formal responses that provide complete sentences, we 
could give the German Ich komme gleich! to the English“I am coming!” But they are 
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so different that English does not do justice to the German expression. The word 
gleich has no counterpart in the English expression. Perhaps in this case, the Filipino 
expression could capture the German better: 
 Mutter: Komm hier. Kind: Gleich! 
 Nanay: Halika rito.  Anak: Nariyan na po! 
 
 I add a Filipino translation here because German and Filipino children seem to 
be saying exactly the same thing in cases like this. English could only capture the 
same sense awkwardly through expressions like“I am already there!” or “I’m coming 
immediately!” Both expressions are hardly spoken and do not roll off the tongue 
easily. This is gleich in the spatial sense of the child being here (in the playground) 
but it is as if the child is already there (on the front porch). The proclamation 
dissolves the spatial difference by way of instantaneous time. 
Zarathustra and The Nuptial Ring of Rings 
 We now glean from the above examples how gleich refers to what is 
immediate, immediately present, or imminent. I am building a case for a 
reconsideration of what it is that eternally recurs or eternally returns. If it is das 
Gleiche which eternally recurs or returns, and if gleich refers to what is immediate, 
immediately present, or imminent, then it is precisely the immediate, immediately 
present or imminent which eternally returns or recurs. 
 Returning to the only transcendent concept in Nietzsche: the eternal, I now 
state clearly that for Nietzsche, time is that which he eternalizes. But the four senses 
of eternity enumerated at the beginning of this paper do not apply here. Even the 
notion of eternity as eternal present does not capture Nietzsche’s meaning. The eternal 
present is but a snapshot of reality but reality keeps moving on. No matter how often 
you say the word “now,” each utterance is a particular moment that fades into the 
oblivion of the past. Time as eternal present is not our experience of time. 
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Nietzsche’s commitment to all things earthly and all things human is 
expressed clearly in the teaching of Zarathustra at the beginning of that book for 
everyone and no one. Zarathustra, addressing people for the first time since his ten-
year seclusion in his cave announces:  
I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe 
those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons 
whether they know it or not. They are despisers of life, dying off and self-
poisoned, of whom the earth is weary: so let them fade away! Once the 
sacrilege against God was the greatest sacrilege, but God died, and then all 
these desecrators died. Now to desecrate the earth is the most terrible thing, 
and to esteem the bowels of the unfathomable higher than the meaning of the 
earth (Nietzsche 2006, 6)! 
 
The same book ends5 with Zarathustra wedding himself to eternity. In “The Seven 
Seals (Or: The Yes And Amen Song),” Zarathustra proclaims his “wedding vows” 
which end with this passage: 
Oh how then could I not lust for eternity and for the nuptial ring of rings – the 
ring of recurrence! Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted 
children, unless it were this woman whom I love: for I love you, oh eternity! 
For I love you, oh eternity (Nietzsche 2006, 187)! 
 
If Zarathustra is to be true to himself, his teaching to remain faithful and to 
esteem the earth must be compatible with his love for and marital promises to 
eternity. For Nietzsche, our only experience of time is the human and earthly 
experience of time. Thus he would not accept the transcendent senses of eternity 
already enumerated above. Thus to be faithful to the earth and to live the meaning of 
the earth is to live and experience time in the only earthly and human way: through 
the present as das Gleiche. As I have already pointed out through the linguistic 
analysis above, this is not just the present experienced as the fleeting now but an 
opening up to the future as also already here, imminent. Given that Nietzsche uses the 
 
5 I refer to the end of the book as it was first published in 1883 and 1884. 
Nietzsche distributed the fourth part privately. His family published it eight years 
later. 
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imagery himself, it would not be a stretch to say that the “yes, I do” of the wedding 
vow is a yes to the present but also an opening up for the future as already here. Now 
and eternity are not two realities fused into one. Note Zarathustra’s desire for eternity 
is a desire to beget children with her as well. The present is always pregnant with the 
possibilities of the future. The experience of time as das Gleiche refers to both now 
and eternity as one and the same and therefore that which eternally recurs. 
In this sense, it is incorrect to say that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence teaches 
us to live for the moment given that life is short and time waits for no one. This would 
be a very narrow rapport with the present and with time. Aside from that, it is also 
nihilistic and life-denying. It is not true that all that we have is the present and nothing 
more. Our analysis of das Gleiche inaugurated an understanding of the present as 
opening up to a future that is already experienced as being at hand. My treatment up 
to this point tarries in allegory and symbolism. Allow me now to show more 
concretely how eternalized time as das Gleiche is humanly experienced. 
Das Gleiche as Experienced in Music and Art 
Das Gleiche as immediacy could be expressed by the appreciation of music 
and art. In an approach similar to mine, Kathleen Marie Higgins [born 1954] took 
Nietzsche’s lead in Ecce homo and found a hermeneutical key to Zarathustra. 
Nietzsche said that “Zarathustra as a whole may perhaps be counted as music 
(Nietzsche 2007, 65).” She arrived at the following thesis: 
[E]ternal recurrence as the idea presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is the 
expression of a general attitude to life that contrasts with the past-obsessed 
perspective that Nietzsche believes goes hand in hand with the Christian moral 
worldview. 
 
[She] go[es] on to suggest an analogy for the kind of present-centered 
perspective that the doctrine expresses: the temporal orientation proposed by 
the doctrine of eternal recurrence is like the temporal orientation that we 
assume while listening to a piece of music (Higgins 1987, 160). 
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The eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s response to the nihilism of Western 
civilization which carries along with it the Christian moral worldview.  I shall not 
rehearse that point here so as not to digree from the concern of this paper, which is the 
meaning of the Same and its implications on our attitude towards time.  
Earlier in this paper, I noted that recurrence is a reference to running. Let us 
think of the jeepney traversing its looped route like the one labeled UP Ikot in the 
University of the Philippines, Diliman, or the Ejeep going around the Ateneo de 
Manila University campus in Loyola Heights. As the ride stops at a particular station, 
all the other stations come before and at the same time after it when you take the 
perspective of the driver of the ride. Since the transport vehicle goes around and 
around endlessly, past and future are the same because the same stations passed in the 
past are the same stations that it will pass in the future. Everything is experienced in 
the present moment, symbolized by the transport vehicle itself but opens up to all the 
stations in the past for those are also all the same stations in the future. 
Similarly, Higgins interprets the encounter between Zarathustra and the dwarf 
in “On the Vision and the Riddle” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the same way. The 
present is the gateway Moment (Augenblick) and past and future stretch endlessly 
contradicting each other in the present. Imagining that past and future are connected 
to form a loop, like the UP Ikot or Ateneo Ejeep rides, past and future are resolved as 
the same. 
When the dwarf murmurs contemptuously that “All that is straight lies. All 
truth is crooked, time itself is a circle (Nietzsche 2006, 125),” he is chastised by 
Zarathustra as making it too easy for himself. This is because the dwarf’s notion of 
eternity is that of simultaneity of all parts of time, that which we noted is from the 
vantage point of a God who exists outside of time. This is not the view nor the 
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teaching of Zarathustra, as we have shown above. Zarathustra’s emphasis on the 
gateway Moment is Nietzsche’s emphasis on the present moment as the only real 
experience of time that is available to us mortals. Let us now follow Higgins’s foray 
into musicology to help us understand the significance of the present moment.   
Higgins is indebted to the insights of Victor Zuckerkandl [1896-1965] as 
expressed in his 1956 book Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World. 
Zuckerkandl’s observations of the several features of the temporality of music are 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. For example, when we count the beat 
as one-two, the two here does not simply express mathematical symmetry but a 
movement to and fro. As the conductor’s hand swings like a pendulum, the one-beat 
completes the last movement but also simultaneously begins the next. Moreover, it is 
not memory that makes it possible for us to appreciate music because memory only 
pieces together bits and pieces in its reconstruction of the past. On the contrary, the 
intro of the musical piece portends the entire piece in that the intro brings in the 
promise of the entire piece. Throughout the performance, we do not grasp moment 
after moment of the running of the music but the entire musical piece is contained in 
every moment of its running. The clamor for a repeat performance is a search for the 
immediacy of the experience that no recollection could ever reconstruct. People need 
to hear the music play; play in the present to appreciate the music as a whole. If a 
repeat performance is impossible, the audience will end up humming it to themselves 
and play it over in their heads. This is not an act of remembering the music that was 
played. It is allowing the selfsame music to continue playing on in one’s head, 
sometimes wittingly, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes to the point that it 
nauseates as the so-called last song syndrome. Higgins summarizes her insight this 
way: 
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Our attitude in musical listening is an attitude of delight in the present. Our 
delight, like our musical concentration, is not contingent on our sense that 
some clear progress is being made. On the contrary, we enjoy great music 
because of its circuitousness, its ingenuity at taking devious paths toward its 
evident aims, its instinct for moving in ways contrary to precedent, its 
unmitigated sense of life. We enjoy the fullness of the present musical 
moment, even if it is dissonant, not for its efficiency in moving toward the 
evident musical goal, but for its own surprising presence (Higgins 1987, 184). 
 
The observations and insights from music help us understand the eternal 
recurrence as a present-oriented attitude towards life. Earlier in this paper, I showed 
the rejection of interpretations of the doctrine in terms of metempsychosis. Now, the 
linear model of time proposed by the Christian moral worldview is also overcome. In 
the Christian worldview, human sinfulness in the past is dissolved once and for all by 
the Lamb of God on Golgotha, thus Christians are called to repent from their sins to 
merit the promise of redemption in heaven. Its focus is the sinfulness of the past and 
the promise of the future. Thus, to Zarathustra’s eyes, the Christian is not oriented to 
the present and has turned away from the meaning of the earth. Setting Zarathustra to 
music leads us to understand how the eternal recurrence eternalizes the present so that 
mortals may learn the meaning of the earth; the only meaning that we could ever 
really have.  
The experience of the immediate and imminent is fundamental to art 
appreciation. One has to sit and read through a book. One has to stand in front of a 
painting to behold and contemplate it. One has to witness the performance of theater 
or music even if these are enjoyed through recorded media. Past, present, and future 
all blend together as one while the participant is enjoying the work of art. For one 
thing, there is anticipation of what is yet to unfold but at the same time it is also a 
retention of what has unfolded. All these interactions enter an interplay within the 
experience of art. It is as if time is standing still but at the same time, it is the passing 
of time which allows for the unfolding of the work of art. The experience of passing 
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time and the eternalization of time both find complete expression without 
contradiction in the experience of the work of art. Our focus has been on music 
because music is the most Nietzschean art form, the most paradigmatic artform for 
Nietzsche. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is the meaning of the Same in the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence of the same. Given the two expressions of the doctrine as either 
eternal recurrence or eternal return, I clarified why the choice of the former over the 
latter is made in the current study: namely that the focus on time that our 
investigations make in this study leads to the choice of recurrence for its resonance 
with time as evidenced by the imagery of running in the Latin root of the word which 
also corresponds to the German word Wiederkunft. 
Stambaugh’s reflections on the meaning of eternity functioned as a guidepost 
to understand the doctrine further in terms of the meaning of eternity as transcendent 
in Nietzsche and his rejection of other notions of transcendence. An indissoluble 
affinity between time and eternity is established in Stambaugh’s interpretation of the 
eternal recurrence. 
I offered my own linguistic analysis for the original German word that 
Nietzsche used which came to be translated in English as the Same. By demonstrating 
some of the ways the German word gleich is used where its translation into same does 
not capture its meaning, I was able to show that aside from the sense of being the 
same or being self-same, the German word gleich also points to the immediacy of the 
present, the instantaneity of the present, which also at the same time looks to the 
immediate future as always already here. In gleich, the hour has not yet descended but 
it is expressed as if it already has. 
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The observations regarding the meaning of das Gleiche as applied to the 
eternal recurrence found textual confirmation in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
I showed in the basic teaching of Zarathustra as well as the final scene of its third 
section that the meaning of the earth and loving eternity are joined together in the ring 
of rings: the ring of recurrence. The attitude expressed by das Gleiche is a yes to the 
present as it opens up to a future that is already at hand, not to a faraway utopia. 
promised land, or paradise that is unreachable and intangible. 
The symbolic expressions I took from Zarathustra are given concrete 
manifestations by borrowing Higgins’s comparison of the eternal recurrence to the 
temporal experience of music. Here we saw that it is not human memory that 
reconstructs the musical experience for the sake of appreciation. The immediacy of 
passing through the temporal manifestation of music gave a very intimate rapport with 
time in that the experience is now described as another expression of das Gleiche: the 
now of the musical experience is also already an enjoyment of the entire musical 
piece that continues to be an opening to what the musical piece has in store as it 
continues to unfold. 
The present-oriented understanding of eternal recurrence allowed Higgins to 
show how the doctrine of eternal recurrence is meant to dissolve the doctrine of sin in 
the Christian worldview. If Christianity is forever past-oriented with its obsession 
with fault and sin, the eternal recurrence is present-oriented with its emphasis on this 
life here and now with our feet consciously planted on the earth. 
Therefore, I have shown in this paper Nietzsche’s understanding of time as 
eternalized in his doctrine of eternal recurrence, where that which recurs is time itself 
as immediately present but always already living the possibility of the future as 
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already at hand. This is how my reading of Stambaugh and Higgins, together with my 
linguistic analysis of das Gleiche leads to a reconsidered meaning of the Same. 
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